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It is increasingly realized that knowledge is the most important resource and that learning is the 
most important process in the economy. Sometimes this is expressed by coining the current era as 
characterised by a ‘knowledge based economy’. But this concept might be misleading by indicating 
that there is one common knowledge base on which economic activities can be built. In this paper 
we argue that it is more appropriate to see the economy as connecting to different ‘pools of 
knowledge’. The argument is built upon a conceptual framework where we make distinctions 
between private/public, local/global, individual/collective and tacit/codified knowledge. The 
purpose is both ‘academic’ and practical. Our analysis demonstrates the limits of a narrowly 
economic perspective on knowledge and we show that these distinctions have important 
implications both for innovation policy and for management of innovation. 
 
Key words: Knowledge, economic development  







In Lundvall (1992) we started the analysis of innovation systems from a characterisation of the 
current state of the economy as one where “knowledge is the most important resource and learning 
the most important process”. But it was a declaration with limited analytical backing. We did not 
give much insight in how knowledge and learning relate to innovation and to economic 
performance. In this chapter we present a conceptual framework and we make distinctions between 
private/public, local/global, individual/collective and tacit/codified knowledge. The purpose is both 
‘academic’ and practical. Our analysis demonstrates the limits of a narrowly economic perspective 
on knowledge but we also show that these distinctions have important implications both for 
innovation policy and for management of innovation.  
The chapter introduces a conceptual framework for analysing knowledge in relation to economic 
development. It does so through a critical analysis of the perception that the economy has ‘a 
knowledge base’. Over the last decade it has become commonplace among policy-makers to refer to 
the current period as characterised by a knowledge-based economy and increasingly it is 
emphasised that the most promising strategy for economic growth is to strengthen the knowledge 
base of the economy (Abramowitz and David, 1996; Foray and Lundvall, 1996; OECD 2000). This 
discourse raises a number of unresolved analytical issues. What constitutes the knowledge base? At 
what level can we locate and define a knowledge base? We will show that the idea of ‘one 
knowledge-base’ is misleading and that the kind of knowledge that matters for the economy should 
rather be regarded as many separate ‘pools’, each with limited access. Using the standard 
terminology of economics, most knowledge is neither a strictly private nor is it a strictly public 
good. Rather than regarding such knowledge pools as assets we should see them as constituting a 
‘community resource’ that cannot be transformed into private property. 
The economics of knowledge 
Knowledge and information appear in standard economic models in two different contexts. One 
relates to decision-making.  The other context is one in where knowledge appears as technology that 
is transformed into techniques used by firms to produce scarce tangible products. It is of interest to 
consider how knowledge is treated in these two contexts in the old and the new neo-classical 
economics. 
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and sometimes hyperrational (i.e. assuming rational expectations). Here information is free and 
costless. The old neo-classical growth theory consistently regards technological change as 
exogenous. New technologies appear for reasons not spelled out in the theory and access to the 
technical knowledge is assumed to be unlimited. The image often used is a ‘book-of-blueprints’ free 
of use. 
The new growth theory and the new trade theory is more ambitious in its attempt to explain 
technological change. In new growth theory, the output of the R&D sector is viewed either as a 
blueprint for a new production process more efficient than the previous one; it is assumed that it can 
be protected by private property instruments such as patents; or as a new semi-manufactured goods 
not easily copied by competitors (Verspagen, 1992, p. 29-30). But the assumption of rational agents 
is not fundamentally revised. Firms are assumed to optimise their investment in new products and 
processes. 
The old neo-classical is consistent in treating knowledge as exogenous but it has nothing to offer in 
terms of explaining knowledge production and use. The analytical framework is valid for a 
stationary state corresponding to Schumpeter’s ‘circular flow’. In such a state all agents may have 
established access to all information they need and there is neither new information nor new 
technology emerging that needs to be explained. 
The new neo-classical theory is not consistent in this respect. It operates on the basis of two types of 
knowledge with opposite characteristics. Some information – the information needed to make a 
decision – is not at all scarce; other elements of knowledge can be obtained only by investing or 
buying. The only solution to this inconsistency would be to assume that the information utilised by 
decision makers and the technological knowledge emanate from two different universes – one static 
and one dynamic. 
The other major problem for standard economics when analysing knowledge is the dictum of 
methodological individualism. It is assumed that the agent operating as decision maker and as 
owner of knowledge is an individual. Either knowledge is the property of an individual or it is 
accessible for all individual agents.  
  2The fact that fundamental elements of knowledge are shared without being public cannot be 
captured without abandoning methodological individualism. Languages, common codes, trust 
relationships, shared routines and standards shared within a community cannot be reduced to assets 
and neither can they be transacted in the market. But since access to them is restricted to a 
community neither are they public goods. The basic starting point that everything, including 
knowledge, is an asset and potentially ‘property’ that can be transacted in markets makes standard 
economics less well suited for analysing knowledge. 
Evolutionary economics does not suffer from such inconsistencies. Bounded rationality and 
innovation are core elements in the theory and so are shared routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Evolutionary economics is much better suited to analyse an economy where knowledge is a key 
resource. 
Rational Choice 
The very foundation of standard economics is the analysis of rational choice made by individual 
agents. Thus, how much and what kind of information agents have about the world in which they 
operate and their ability to process the information are crucial issues that draw the lines between 
major economic schools. While neo-classical economics sticks to the assumption that agents are 
rational – and sometimes hyperrational (i.e. assuming rational expectations) - Austrian economists 
(Hayek 1937), Keynesians (Keynes 1936) and organisational economists such as Herbert Simon  
assume bounded rationality – i.e. a combination of a complex and uncertain environment and agents 
with limited capacity to process information.  
It is obvious that agents do make choices between well-defined alternatives from time to time and 
that in some contexts these choices involve a calculation of costs and benefits in order to find the 
alternative that is most attractive in economic terms. But agents do not only make choices and they 
do not make choices all the time. Actually, most of the time agents follow routines or they do things 
without considering their own costs and benefits in economic terms. Many activities take place in 
interaction with others and the ‘utility’ of these activities are highly dependent on what pleasure the 
others get from the activity – this is true for sports, love-making and many other kinds of cultural 
and social activities (Mead 1934). These become more important as we get richer and less focused 
on filling our bellies and buying and driving cars.  This kind of argument is however lost on neo-
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even the most fashionable tools of game theory would have to be re-thought. 
Therefore we will only state here that in a world where agents are involved in innovation and where 
innovation is important for economic performance – and this seems to be the case in the world we 
live in these days  – the idea of explaining economic dynamics by models assuming that agents 
know all possible outcomes is not reasonable. Innovation is by definition a process where the 
alternative outcomes cannot be defined in advance – if these could be defined in advance we would 
not regard it as innovation. Actually we might say that not only do we operate under fundamental 
uncertainty in the modern economy – we operate under radical fundamental uncertainty: the only 
thing we know for certain is that there are constantly surprise outcomes of out decisions on their 
way. We know that there will be new technologies, new patterns of consumer behaviour and new 
forms of organisation that we cannot define in advance. Whatever neo-classical economics is useful 
for, it is not for explaining an economy where knowledge is the most important resource and 
innovation and learning the most important processes. 
Is knowledge a public or a private good? Or is it a community resource? 
The other context where knowledge appears in economics is as an asset that can be owned, 
exchanged and reproduced. It may also appear as input or output in an economic process. 
Let us start with the classical question about the character of knowledge as public or private good. 
In economic theory, the properties that give a good the attribute of ‘public’ are the following:  
-  the benefits can be enjoyed by many users concurrently as well as sequentially without 
being diminished – the good is non-rival; 
-   it is costly for the provider to exclude unauthorised users – the good is partially non-
excludable. 
One reason for the interest in the public good issue is that it is crucial for defining the role of 
government in knowledge production. If knowledge were a public good, freely accessible for 
anyone, there would be no (economic) incentive for private agents to invest in its production. More 
generally, if it is less costly to imitate than to produce new knowledge, the social rate of return 
would be higher than the private rate of return and, again, private agents would under-invest in the 
production of knowledge.  
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there is a role for government either to subsidise or to take charge directly of the production of 
knowledge. Public funding of schools and universities, as well as of generic technologies, is rational 
according to this analysis. It also brings to the fore the legal protection of property rights to 
knowledge, for instance by patent systems. 
The analysis of knowledge as a private or public good may be contrasted to another perspective 
with roots further back in economic theory. Marshall (1923) made the observation that firms 
belonging to the same sector tended to be located together in ‘industrial districts’. He also found 
that such groupings of firms often remained competitive for very long periods. He said that ‘the 
secrets of industry are in the air’ but specified this by pointing to skills in the local labour force and 
local specialised institutions that were local and which could be inherited from one generation to the 
next. 
These two perspectives are opposed not only in their contrasting emphasis on respectively point to 
the need to protect knowledge and to the difficulty to diffuse knowledge. The industrial district 
perspective points to a more radical break with the neo-classical analysis since here knowledge is 
neither private nor public in the neo-classical sense. Since there is no simple way to enforce private 
ownership to the regional knowledge – to privatise the benefits from the knowledge commons – it is 
more correct to refer to knowledge not as an asset but as a non-marketable  ‘community resource’. 
In standard economics, this kind of phenomenon might be referred to as externalities or 
agglomeration effects. But we would argue that they represent ‘typical’ forms of economically 
important knowledge and that therefore their emergence and development need to be understood 
not as an exceptional phenomena but as regular outcomes of socio-economic processes.  
But the two perspectives raise similar questions. Can knowledge be transferred from one place to 
another? How difficult is it to transfer knowledge and what are the transfer mechanisms? Is it 
possible to change the form of knowledge (for instance through codification) so that it gets easier 
(more difficult) to transfer? One reason for the distinctions between different kinds of knowledge 
proposed below is that they help to sort out these questions. 
Responding to these questions is also a way of specifying how the knowledge base of the economy 
is constituted. If knowledge were completely public it would be meaningful to speak of one common 
knowledge base for the whole economy and there would be a strong need for co-ordinating 
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individual and private there would be no common knowledge base at all and investment in 
knowledge production could be left to the individuals themselves.  
As we shall see below, as often is the case, reality is complex and most knowledge is neither 
completely public nor completely private. Some knowledge is ‘in the air’ locally but cannot easily 
be moved out of the local context. The knowledge base is fragmented and may best be illustrated as 
constituted by a number of semi-public ‘community pools” with shared access regionally, 
professionally or through networking. Limited access means that some are excluded from even 
approaching these pools while others with access may lack the necessary tools to tap into them. 
The last decades have witnessed two different tendencies that tend to change the private/public 
character of knowledge. On the one hand the widening use of information technology and the 
increasing importance of communicating scientific knowledge in the economy has given strong 
incentives as well as more efficient instruments when it comes to codify knowledge and make it 
explicit. This tends to make knowledge more widely accessible. But on the other hand, and to some 
degree as a response to the codification trend, there has been a strong political push in favour of de 
facto and legal protection of intellectual property. Led by the big US companies that operate 
science-based sectors multinational companies worldwide have successfully lobbied for more broad 
and strict legal protection first at the national level and later on at the global level. 
This means that there are at least two different types of barriers around knowledge pools. Some 
reflect that competence is unequally distributed in space and lack of absorptive capacity. Others 
reflect political power and legal institutions denying access to those without formal ownership. The 
first ones may in principle be overcome by investment in knowledge and competence building and 
by joining networks. The height and character of the second type of barrier will reflect the use of 
political power in negotiations. Both these barriers tend to re-inforce the inequality of the 
distribution of knowledge and it might be argued that without  a global ‘new new deal’ with focus 
on access to knowledge we will tend to develop an increasingly polarized world.   
A terminology of knowledge 
In 1987, Sidney Winter concluded an important contribution on knowledge and management by 
pointing out that there is “a paucity of language” and “a serious dearth of appropriate terminology 
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then, the number of relevant publications has grown immensely and some progress has been made 
(see Foray, 2000;David and Foray, 2002: Amin and Cohendet 2004), but as compared to Winter’s 
original analysis, little headway has been made in terms of a terminology acceptable to all. There is 
little agreement on questions such as: What is the meaning of knowledge? What separations and 
distinctions between different kinds of knowledge are most useful for understanding how 
knowledge affects economic development? 
Knowledge of the Mind, Body and Soul 
One classical distinction is the one between data, information, knowledge and wisdom. Data are the 
raw material used to construct information. Knowledge is necessary to get meaning from 
information. Wisdom is needed in order use knowledge. 
These distinctions may be useful for some purposes but the selection and ordering of them reflect a 
bias in the way knowledge is regarded. The focus is on mental cognition where knowledge is 
something absorbed through access to information and analysed in the mind. An alternative 
understanding of knowledge is represented by the philosophy of Dewey and the pragmatist Chicago 
School. Here knowledge is seen as emanating from practise and as layered not in a separate mind 
but in the body as a whole (Kolb). 
In modern society there are many specialised organisations and institutions that promote the 
training of the mind. Some of them are actually based on the assumption that knowledge is learnt 
through getting access to information and those who operate them may see learning as a cognitive 
process separated from practice. But closer analysis of scientific work shows that practice is 
fundamental for learning and that expert knowledge is located in the body. Actually you might 
define expertise as a stage where you do not have to go through a stepwise analytical process but 
can draw directly upon ‘back-bone’ knowledge. 
There is a tension between mind and body in the historical and analytical understanding of 
knowledge. The distinction between explicit knowledge (mind) and tacit knowledge (body) 
illustrates this tension and so does the organisation of economic activities where certain parts of 
organisations (R&D-department) may be seen as mainly concerned with cognition (mind) where 
other parts (production departments) are seen as involved in practical action (body). In fact there is 
no learning and knowledge without involving the body and very limited learning in societies 
  7without cognitive attempts to make elements of tacit knowledge explicit. We are going to use the 
distinction between tacit and codified knowledge below but we do so in order to demonstrate how 
the two are intertwined and mixed differently in different contexts. In order to see the close 
interdependence and between the two dimensions it is necessary to make the distinction between 
them.  
The social character of knowledge 
Each individual may be seen as a ‘knowledge container’ but what she contains will be more or less 
useful and meaningful in different social contexts. The knowledge of a professor in physics may be 
of little use as participant in a Safari in Africa while a professional lion-hunter may be of little use 
at a scientific conference in Boston. So the context makes all the difference. 
Most meaningful knowledge is constructed in an interaction with others and gets a meaning in an 
interaction with others. Interaction involves communication and co-operation. Communication may 
be oral or take place via gestures or with the help of artefacts. It may take place in a more or less 
structured context – as speech or as conversation. Co-operation may be more or less purposeful as 
work or play (Amin and Cohendet, 2004).  
Knowledge of importance for economic purposes may be rooted in the relationships within a team, 
in routines common to the firm or in a wider community extending outside the borders of the single 
firm. The team may be a formal working unit but it may also be a self-organising community. Here 
we will refer to it as a ‘community team’ we prefer to reserve ‘community’ tout court for social 
formations that cross the border of the firm. Community teams and communities may be based 
primarily upon epistemology or primarily upon practice. In the first case the major aim is to process 
and produce knowledge while in the second it is find workable solutions to a set of practical 
problems requiring skills that are interrelated (Wenger, 1998). 
But not all community knowledge remains a community resource. There are strong incentives for 
capitalist firms to transform community knowledge into private property. Inside organisations 
codification of the skills, co-operation and interactions of employees may increase management 
control with the core knowledge of the firm. In relation to competitors there is a strong incentive 
both to protect key elements of the firms technology from access and more generally to block 
competitors access to strategic elements of knowledge. 
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wants to subordinate knowledge under its own rule and transform it into private property. On the 
other hand knowledge thrives in communities and communities cannot be fully subordinated to 
capital and their knowledge transformed into private property without losing their effectiveness as 
sites for knowledge creation and reproduction. The current debate on commercialising university 
research is perhaps the best illustration of this contradiction.
1
Four different kinds of knowledge 
Following Lundvall and Johnson (1994) knowledge is here divided into four categories: 
•  Know-what 
•  Know-why 
•  Know-how 
•  Know-who 
Know-what refers to knowledge about ‘facts’. The number of people who live in Beijing, the 
ingredients necessary to make pancakes, and the year of the French Revolution are examples of this 
kind of knowledge. Here, knowledge is close to what is normally called information – it can easily 
be broken down into bits and communicated as data. 
Know-why refers to knowledge about principles and laws of motion in nature, in the human mind 
and in society. This kind of knowledge has been extremely important for technological development 
in certain science-based areas, such as the chemical and electric/electronic industries. Access to this 
kind of knowledge will often make advances in technology more rapid and reduce the frequency of 
errors in procedures involving trial and error. 
                                                 
1 While, as can be seen from Lundvall and Johnson (1994), we share many of Drucker’s (1993) specific interpretations 
of the modern  economy we do not see it as ‘post-capitalist’. It remains capitalist but with new contradictions that 
relate to the production, use and protection of knowledge becoming more important than before. 
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and production workers, but, actually, it plays a key role in all economic activities. The 
businessman judging the market prospects for a new product or the personnel manager selecting and 
training staff use their know-how. It would also be misleading to characterise know-how as 
practical rather than theoretical. One of the most interesting and profound analyses of the role and 
formation of know-how is actually about scientists’ need for skill formation and personal 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958/1978). Even finding the solution to complex mathematical problems is 
based on intuition and on skills related to pattern recognition rooted in experience-based learning 
rather than on the mechanical carrying out of a series of distinct logical operations (Ziman, 1979, 
pp. 101-102). 
Know-how is often developed individually through experience and kept within the borders of the 
firm or team. As specialisation evolves and complexity of technology and science increases, 
however, co-operation between people and organisations and knowledge sharing becomes 
increasingly necessary (Pavitt, 1998). The more fine-grained and the deeper the division of labour 
among experts the more crucial becomes the mechanisms that link different fields of expertise to 
each other. This is the reason why know-who becomes increasingly important. Know-who involves 
information about who knows what and who knows what to do. But it also involves the social 
ability to co-operate and communicate with experts. Know-who makes it possible to draw upon 
intellectual capital through the means of social capital. 
How public or private are the four kinds of knowledge? 
The public or private character of these kinds of knowledge differs in terms of both degree and 
form. Databases can bring together ‘know-what’ in a more or less user-friendly form. Information 
technology extends enormously the information potentially at the disposal of individual agents, 
although the information still has to be found and what is relevant selected. The effectiveness of 
search machines developed in connection with the Internet is highly relevant in this context, as it 
helps to specify how accessible the data actually are. Even with recent advances in this area, access 
to this kind of knowledge is still far from perfect (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Still today, the most 
effective medium for obtaining pertinent facts may be through the ‘know-who’ channel, 
i.e. contacting an outstanding expert in the field to obtain directions on where to look for a specific 
piece of information. 
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of this work is placed in the public domain. Academics have strong incentives to publish and make 
their results accessible. The Internet offers new possibilities for speedy electronic publishing. Open 
and public access is of course a misnomer, in that it often takes enormous investments in learning 
before the information has any meaning. Again know-who, directed towards academia, may help 
the amateur to obtain a translation into something more comprehensible. 
In some areas where new technological opportunities evolve very quickly and technological 
competition is intense the technical solutions introduced by engineers may get far ahead of 
academic know-why (Vincenti, 1990). Technology may solve problems or perform functions 
without a clear understanding of why it works. Only later on, science may explain the causalities 
involved. Here, know-how comes before know-why. 
Know how is the kind of knowledge with most limited public access and for which mediation is the 
most complex. The basic problem is the difficulty of separating the competence to act from the 
person or organisation that acts. The outstanding expert – cook, violinist, manager – may write a 
book explaining how to do things, but what is done by the amateur on the basis of that explanation 
is, of course, less perfect than what the expert would produce. Attempts to use information 
technology to develop expert systems show that it is difficult and costly to transform expert skills 
into information that can be used by others.  
Know who refers to a combination of information and social relationships. Telephone books listing 
professions and databases listing producers of certain goods and services are in the public domain 
and can, in principle, be accessed by anyone. In the economic sphere, however, it is often necessary 
to connect with specialised competencies and to find the most skilled and reliable expertise; hence 
the importance of good personal relationships with key persons one can trust. These social and 
personal relationships are by definition not public. They cannot be transferred and, more 
specifically, they cannot be bought or sold on the market. As Arrow (1971) has pointed out, “you 
cannot buy trust and, if you could, it would have no value whatsoever”. This is fundamental 
because it implies that the economics of knowledge in order to be relevant needs to seek support in 
other social science disciplines. 
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It is clear from what precedes that very little knowledge is ‘perfectly public’. Even information of 
the know what-type is unavailable to those not connected to telecommunication or social networks. 
Moreover, the current state of information technology still limits access for those who are in fact 
connected. Scientific and other types of complex knowledge may be perfectly accessible, in 
principle, but for effective access the user must have invested in building absorptive capacity. 
Know-how is never fully transferable since how a person does things reflects that individual’s 
personality (even organisations have a “personality” in this sense). 
On the other hand, little economically useful knowledge is completely private in the long run. 
Tricks of the trade are shared within the profession. Know-how can be taught and learnt in 
interaction between the master and the apprentice. New technological knowledge may be costly to 
imitate but, when it is much more efficient than the old, there are several ways to obtain it. Even 
when the owner of private knowledge does not want to share it with others there are ways to obtain 
it, such as reverse engineering; taking products apart to find out how to produce them. If necessary, 
private agents will engage in intelligence activities aimed at getting access to competitors’ secrets. 
Different parts of economic theory handle this mixed situation differently. Underlying much of neo-
classical theory of production and economic growth is the simplifying assumption that there is a 
global bank of blueprints from which anybody can get a copy to be used for starting up production. 
This ignores the fact that only skilled agents can use blue prints and that skills are unevenly 
distributed geographically and socially. Since skill cannot easily be transformed into blueprints the 
idea of general access is not tenable. 
The resource base view of the firm takes a different view and assumes that the competence of the 
firm determines the directions in which it may expand its activities (Penrose, 1958). It is the 
specificity of the knowledge base that determines the specific pattern of economic growth of the 
firm. In a long-term perspective this view leads to a more dynamic perspective – cf. the dynamic 
capability theory of the firm. It points to the need for firms to engage in continuous creation of new 
competencies within the firm and it points to the need to develop ‘learning organisations’. Without 
such efforts, imitation and innovations among competitors would, sooner or later erode the firm’s 
competencies. 
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There is currently a debate among economists about the role of tacit and codified knowledge 
(Cowan, David and Foray 1999; Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall 2002). One reason for the interest is 
that tacit knowledge is definitely not a public good and cannot be transmitted as information. If 
transformed into explicit codes it may both become more easily transferable. The process of 
codification of knowledge is therefore important for understanding the on-going transformation of 
‘the knowledge base’.  
One of the important consequences of the information technology revolution is that it changes both 
the incentives and the tools for codification. It makes it more attractive to transform knowledge into 
information that can be entered on to the Internet. At the same time, it also offers new tools to 
pursue codification and to extend codification to more complex bodies of tacit knowledge. The 
questions to be discussed here are, first, to what degree codification makes knowledge part of a 
generic knowledge base and, second, to what degree it makes knowledge more easily transferable 
across localities and firms. We will argue that the impact of codification is ambiguous in both these 
respects. We will also show that any idea about individual and economic progress as being running 
in parallel with a movement from tacit to codified knowledge is incorrect. 
Codification in the Academic Community 
The context for codification may determine what direction and form it takes – here it is especially 
relevant to make the distinction between the ‘academic’ sphere and the ‘business’ sphere. Scientific 
progress as it is organised by academic institutions is highly dependent on codification and 
codification is a way to make progress more widely diffused and recognised within the academic 
community (Dasgupta and David 1994). You might say that  a high degree  of codification is a 
necessary prerequisite for scientific progress.
2 Codification in the realm of academic research will 
                                                 
2 But not sufficient: it would be a serious mistake to assume that scientific work is based exclusively upon codified 
knowledge. The personal knowledge of the scientist cannot be fully codified and personal knowledge is distributed 
unevenly in space reflecting local learning experiences. And therefore important elements of scientific knowledge are 
localised and embodied in scientists and scientific teams and localised. These elements can be transferred from one 
place to another only through the movement of people. This is why star scientists can earn a lot of money. 
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world-wide common knowledge.  
But scientific progress goes hand in hand with increasing specialisation and complexity. In order to 
access the most advanced knowledge in any specific scientific discipline highly developed expertise 
and advanced infrastructure is needed. Therefore scientific knowledge is public only in a relative 
sense – there might be no barriers from the supply side but in order to establish effective demand 
‘absorptive capacity’ that requires substantial prior investments is needed. 
Second the access to a specific knowledge field among academia does not guarantee that the 
knowledge can be easily transformed into economic results everywhere. For instance, to make 
economic use of the codified knowledge in physics would be dramatically more realistic in a local 
context where there are private agents with R&D-efforts in the field than in a region where no such 
agents were present. To have access to academic knowledge but not to potential users may 
correspond to being rich in raw materials but lacking the tools and technology to exploit them. 
So even if academically organised knowledge in principle can be accessed everywhere it has 
different economic value in different localities. Actually, an acceleration of the codification process 
in the academic sphere may increase global inequality since absorptive capacity is so different in 
the rich and in the poor countries. This lack of absorptive capacity emanates both from a more 
limited competence in the academic field and from a more limited competence in the business 
sector to effectively demand and use academic knowledge in innovation processes. 
Developing countries will need to invest heavily in academic science in order to be able to draw 
upon what appears to be ‘a common global stock of knowledge’ and more importantly they need to 
establish absorptive capacity in the private sector. It is not correct when the World Development 
Report from 1998/99 starts with the following promising words: "Knowledge is like light. 
Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people 
everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in the darkness of poverty – unnecessarily.” Not even 
the most accessible knowledge – i.e. codified academic science travels like light and it is even less 
true for the codified knowledge produced for profit in the private sector.. 
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Firms use knowledge in the form of information as the basis for decision-making and as skills for 
solving problems and designing innovative solutions.  Firms may give different weight to codified 
versus tacit knowledge and they may make more or less big efforts to transform tacit knowledge 
into codified knowledge in relation to decision making, work organisation and organisation of 
innovation.  The balance will reflect the technological and market context. But it may also reflect 
national/cultural context.  
Within a specific context, firms face important dilemmas when deciding how far to go in terms of 
codification. Codification offers potential benefits but it is costly and it has negative consequences. 
In what follows we will make a distinction between codification in relation to respectively decision 
making, organisation of work and organisation of innovation process. We will focus on how 
codification affects world-wide access to knowledge.  
On the use of expert systems within firms 
With the wide use of information technology one might expect firms to substitute for scarce 
management skills by Management Information Systems. The basic idea would be to develop 
expert systems that could be fed by relevant information about business context and then leave it to 
the computer program to come up with the right decision. There is no doubt that there is some 
movement in this direction but it is a movement characterised by hesitation and set-backs. 
Eliasson (1996) has illustrated the limits of using management information systems as a substitute 
for management skills by pointing to the strategic failures of leading producers of management 
information systems such as IBM and other big ICT-firms. Know-how, if it is not economically 
trivial, easy to copy, routines, is never a completely public good and normally firms get access to it 
only by hiring experts or merging with companies with the knowledge they want. It has also been 
demonstrated that the transformation always involves changes in the content of the expert 
knowledge (Hatchuel and Weil, 1995).
3
                                                 
3 The difficulty/impossibility to make a one to one translation of expert knowledge into information 
systems does not mean that the effort to make such a translation is meaningless. Actually the effort may 
be helpful in imposing a more systematic approach rather than trust ‘trial and error’ (Lazaric 2003). This 
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more use of pattern recognition and intuition than they use analytical models. They are not the 
outcome of a logical deductive process. What distinguishes the successful manager or team of 
managers from the less successful is that he/they can handle new and unforeseen problems as well 
as routine problems. This indicates one of the most important limits for the use of information 
management systems. They may be developed and used for rather simple repetitive decisions and in 
an environment that remains stable over time. The more complex the problem the less helpful and 
more dangerous it might be to rely on a management information system to find the right solution 
(Cowan 2001). Complexity in itself might not be a hindrance for codification, however. Other 
factors that refer to the social interaction among agents may be at least as important. From time to 
time new vawes of codification in a field of knowledge may be triggered by new insights into 
technical causalities (Lazaric et al 2003). Perhaps the most important limit to what management is 
willing to invest in codification efforts is related to the stability and change of the field of 
knowledge and of the problems that it has to tackle. If new types of problems appear frequently 
codification may actually invalidate the capacity to deal with the problems. If problems remain 
structured in a similar way the incentive to codify is strong. 
Therefore the impact of information technology on incentives for codification of expert knowledge 
has been contradictory. Information technology has made it more realistic to simulate and reproduce 
complex decision processes. But at the same time the extended use of information technology has 
led to acceleration of change making it less unattractive for firms to get locked into pre-
programmed routines. To this should be added that experts at all levels of organisation will resist 
attempts to codify their knowledge and that top management of all categories is in the best position 
to make this resistance effective.  
This implies that management skills cannot be easily transferred from one context to another. In 
developed countries the most effective way to develop and transfer good management principles 
                                                                                                                                                                  
is a point of more general relevance. In a similar vein it might be very useful for management to make an 
annual report on the knowledge assets of the firm in spit of the fact that the outcome on the bottom line 
may be of dubious and that the routinization of the reporting may be of little use  (Edvinsson 1997). 
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family-owned firms that are stuck with the same top management for a long period are less 
successful in terms of innovation and growth; the most successful firms are part of multinational 
management cultures and here there is an ongoing change in management teams (Lundvall and 
Nielsen 2005). 
For less developed countries this means that developing local management skills and selectively 
learning from management abroad is necessary. There are certainly information systems supporting 
accounting procedures, customer information and procurement and stock control. As far as there is 
a scarcity of management skills it might be rational to invest in such systems. However, these 
systems can be seen as supporting but not as substitutes for strategic decision-making. And their 
intelligent use requires strategic leadership.  
Codifying the work process 
Work may be organised so that it is more or less based upon codification and built in routines. The 
history of work organisation involves stages of codifying skills and building them into machinery or 
into routines to be strictly followed by workers. Scientific management and taylorist forms of 
organisations have in periods been highly productive and effective. Today there is a tendency to 
define the high performance workplace as one where workers have more autonomy – the work 
process is less structured and codified. 
In important new contributions Lorenz and Valeyre (2004) have used employee survey data to 
develop taxonomy for work processes in terms of the learning opportunities they offer to 
employees. They distinguish between four categories: 
-  Simple production 
-  Taylorism 
-  Lean production learning 
-  Discretionary learning 
In their work the focus is on the content of learning of these four forms of work organisation. But 
the four models may also be contrasted in terms of to what degree they codify the skills of workers 
and build them into machinery or into strict routines. Simple production is a mixed category of old 
and new services but it is the least structured while the taylorist organisation is the most highly 
  17codified. Lean production learning model makes use of modern management techniques such as job 
rotation and team work but leaves little autonomy to the individual worker. This contrasts with the 
discretionary learning model where the employees are given more freedom to make choices. We 
would argue that Lean Production is less structured than Taylorism but more structured than 
Discretionary learning. 
On the basis of the data developed by Lorenz and Valeyre we can get an idea of how the workforce 
is distributed between the four forms in fifteen European countries. It is interesting to note that there 
seems to be a tendency that the workforce of countries at different income levels are distributed 
differently over these four categories.  
To illustrate we have ordered six European countries according to GNP per capita and presented 
how the workforce is distributed across the four archetypes of working organisation. The most 
important result is the complex relationship between level of economic development and degree of 
codification of the work process. At low income levels the work process will become more codified 
until a certain point and after that it will become less codified.  




Lean production  Taylorist 
organisation 
Simple organisation 
Denmark  60,0 21,9 6,8  11,3 
Netherlands  64,0 17,2 5,3  13,5 
     
Germany  44,3 19,6 14,3 21,9 
France  38,0 33,3 11,1 17,7 
     
Portugal  26,1 28,1 23,0 22,8 
Greece  18,7 25,6 28,0 27,7 
EU-15  39,1 28,2 13,6 19,1 
Source : Third Working Condition survey. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 
  18Economic development that involves a growth of manufacturing activities in a context of skill 
shortages will increase the proportion of workers in Taylorist organisations (cf. Portugal and 
Greece). At a later stage of development more demanding in terms of flexibility and innovation it 
becomes more rational to give workers more autonomy and the proportion of Taylorist work is 
reduced (Germany and France). In (small) economies with high income per capita the need for 
continuous innovation and adaptation to change is even bigger and here we find a movement toward 
discretionary learning (Netherlands and Denmark). The table shows that  there is not a linear 
relationship between degree of codification of work and the level of economic development. 
The background for this pattern is that codification of workers’ skills has both advantages and 
drawbacks also seen from the point of view of management. Codifying the skills of employees may 
make the firm less dependent on employees. If it is possible to build the skills into machinery and 
routines the firm may succeed in establishing a situation where parts of the labour force may be 
substituted without negative effects on performance. In a context where there is a dramatic shortage 
of skilled labour a Taylorist organisation with much of workers’ competence built into the 
machinery might be seen as attractive. 
The negative side of this strategy is that the labour force may remain unskilled and that upgrading 
production will not take place. Also the firm will be vulnerable to external shocks. When the 
context – technology or market – changes the organisation will not be able to adapt since it is 
designed to solve a constant and narrow set of problems. Only in a context of stable technology and 
stable demand this kind of organisation may be attractive.  Today this is typical for sectors where 
value-added per employee is limited. This is why developing countries with shortage of skilled 
labour risk to be stuck in such activities. 
At the aggregate level of the national production system, having a strong presence of such rigid 
organisations would imply a high birth and death rate of organisations. The alternative to the 
adaptation of existing organisations is that they die when they cannot cope and that new ones 
appear. High frequencies of birth and death of firms are sometimes interpreted as signs of a sound 
entrepreneurial economy but it also reflects the degree of rigidity of existing organisations. To close 
down an existing organisation and establish a new one involves substantial ‘transformation costs’ in 
terms of lost community knowledge. This is why less developed economies specialised in the most 
taylorist steps in the global value chains may be victims both to lock in into low value added 
activities and high vulnerability to external shocks. 
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There is a bias in western philosophy favouring analytical and highly structured knowledge while 
regarding intuitive knowledge rooted in experience as being of a lower order (Nonaka and Takeuchi 
1995). Our analysis of codification of academic knowledge, expert knowledge, work processes and 
innovation does not support this view. 
The closer we get to the frontier of science the more the scientist relies on experience and on her 
capacity to recognise patterns without being able to present her analysis as a logical sequence. The 
more complex the management task and the more dynamic the context the less can the firm rely on 
expert systems. 
Highly codified work organisations such as those dominated by taylorism are characterising less 
developed economies where skills are scarce. In high income countries more and more employees 
are given more free reins to engage in unstructured problem solving, individually and in teams. 
Innovation modes based upon science and giving major attention to codified knowledge cannot 
stand alone. They need to be supported by organisational forms that promote experience-based 
learning and resulting, not in disembodied codified knowledge, but in new skills and new products. 
  
Work process codification has made knowledge more accessible worldwide. Today it is possible to 
establish industrial processes also in areas where skilled labour is scarce. This is reflected in the 
tendency toward more and more developed global value chains and more generally in the 
increasingly global competition for commodities. For developing countries it is a key problem to 
find a way of building change into such Taylorist organisations. One option is to develop elements 
of  ‘lean production learning’. Lean production implies that workers may work in teams, change 
tasks and get some limited discretion in solving problems as they appear. This might give the 
minimum of space for learning that in the longer run can increase the value added in such processes. 
But in big emerging economies such as China where the ambition is to develop home-spun 
innovations in highly dynamic technological fields there might be a need to move directly toward 
discretionary learning in certain parts of the economy exposed to rapid change in technology and 
market. 
  20Codification in relation to the innovation process 
Most authors using the concept of knowledge creation and knowledge production refer to technical 
innovation as the output of the process (Antonelli, 1999; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In new 
growth theory, the output of the R&D sector is viewed either as a blueprint for a new production 
process more efficient than the previous one or as a new semi-manufactured goods not easily copied 
by competitors (Romer 1990; Verspagen, 1992, p. 29-30). 
The process of innovation may be more or less codified. One example of a highly codified 
innovation process would be the development of a new pharmaceutical product where a new 
chemical formula is the basis of the innovation. One example of a less codified innovation would be 
the development of a new machine where the operator changes the machine on the basis of his own 
experience.  
In Jensen et al (2004) we make the distinction between two different modes of innovation. The STI-
mode refers to the science, technology, innovation sequence and the process operates mainly on the 
basis of the codified knowledge while the DUI-mode operates mainly on the basis of experience 
based learning by doing, using and interaction. Here we will consider how the two modes affect the 
access to the outcome of the innovation process. Is a codified outcome easier to transfer across 
organisational boundaries and geographical borders than the outcome of a DUI process? 
The STI-mode 
The dichotomy, should not be taken to imply an absence of complementarities between the two 
modes. For instance, scientists operating at the frontier of their field in the R&D departments of 
large firms need to draw upon their tacit experience based knowledge when making experiments 
and interpreting results, and specific R&D-projects will often be triggered by problems emanating 
from practice. We may still define it as predominantly STI if immediate attempts are made to 
restate the problem in codified form. The R&D-department may start going through its earlier work, 
looking for pieces of codified knowledge, as well as looking for codified knowledge that can be 
drawn from outside sources. In order to communicate with scientists and scientific institutions 
outside it may be necessary to translate the problem into a formal scientific code. 
All through the process documenting results in a codified form remains important. It is not 
sufficient that the single scientist keeps results in his own memory as tacit knowledge. Often the 
  21project involves teamwork and modularization where single results are used as building blocks for 
other members in the team. At the end of the process – if it is successful - a transfer of the results 
within the organization or across organizational borders will call for codified documentation as 
well. When an patent application is made the documentation needs to be made in a techno-scientific 
language that allows the patenting authority to judge the originality of the innovation. 
This means that, on balance, the STI-mode of learning even if it starts from a local problem will 
make use of ‘global’ know-why knowledge all the way through and, ideally, it will end up with 
‘potentially global knowledge’ – i.e. knowledge that could be used widely if it were not protected 
by intellectual property rights.  
The DUI-mode 
The DUI-mode of innovation (Doing, Using, Interacting) refers to an innovation process where 
there is emphasis on the utilisation of know-how and know-who that is tacit and often highly 
localized. This mode may result in incremental innovation in simple organisations but it is also 
present when it comes to realise radical innovation. Here it requires organisational structures and 
relationships that enhance and utilize learning by doing, using and interacting in order. In terms of 
the work organisation patterns it implies combinations of discretionary and lean production 
learning. 
Box 2: Adam Smith and the two modes of innovation - DUI and STI 
Adam Smith’s links the development of the division of labor to innovation in two different ways and doing so he 
actually indicates two different modes of innovation. One experience-based that corresponds to DUI-learning while the 
other is science-based and corresponds to STI-learning. 
Adam Smith (1776: p. 8) on the DUI-mode of innovation:  
A great part of the machines made use of
  in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were 
originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, 
naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it. Whoever has 
been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, must frequently have been shown very pretty machines, which 
were the inventions of such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. 
Adam Smith (1776: p. 9) on the STI-mode of innovation: 
All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion 
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to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or 
men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, 
are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. 
  The DUI mode of learning is characterised by on-going change that continuously confront 
employees with new problems and incite learning by doing (Arrow 1962a). Finding solutions to 
these problems enhances the skills of the employees and extend their repertoires. Some of the 
problems are specific while others are generic. Therefore learning may result in both specific and 
general competencies for the operator. When the process is complex – a good example is the 
learning-by-using of new models of airplanes - it will involve interaction within and between teams 
and it may result in shared routines for the organization. As the whole organization gets more 
insight in the actual working of the system it might find more efficient ways to organize work and 
solve problems as they pop up. This is the kind of case that Rosenberg (1982) uses to illustrate 
learning-by-using. Both learning by doing and using normally involve interaction between people 
and departments and this is why such practices as cross-functional groups and job rotation show 
positive relations to learning and performance.  
I has been argued that learning by doing and learning by using only result in ‘local’ knowledge and 
that without codification and transformation of the knowledge into codified knowledge the impact 
on the economy as a whole would remain limited. In a recent paper I have argued that this argument 
neglects the outcome of learning by interacting involving users and producers. The introduction of 
new products emanating from this kind of interaction is an alternative way of transforming local 
learning into more global knowledge. The new products will embody experiences made by several 
users. From the view-point of the whole economy the learning by interacting has the effect of 
transforming local learning into general knowledge embodied in for instance new machinery, new 
components, new software-systems or even new business solutions (Lundvall 2006). 
How does the STI- and the DUI-mode of innovation affect the transferability of knowledge? 
While the output of the DUI-mode may be a tangible new product with embodied technical 
knowledge – such as a numerically controlled machine tool – the outcome of the STI-process may 
be disembodied knowledge that can be widely distributed. But the more codified form makes it also 
more easy to protect this kind of knowledge through intellectual property rights in the form of a 
patents or a licenses. 
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knowledge creation process by making explicit fundamental characteristics of the new product or 
process. This contrasts with the outcome of the DUI-mode where the new knowledge is embedded 
in the new product or process but not made explicit and not transformed into disembodied 
knowledge that can be traded in the market. If the outcome is a new product reverse engineering 
may be an option for competitors. If it is a new process for internal use the access will be limited. 
Here the mobility of employees may be an alternative transfer mechanism. 
Normally one would expect codified output of the innovation process to contribute to making new 
technology more accessible worldwide than embodied knowledge. In the current period where 
protection of codified knowledge has become a major concern of firms that are world leaders in 
advanced technology this might not be the case.  The STI-mode resulting in disembodied codified 
knowledge may actually result in more restrictive access than the DUI-mode where the final 
product is a new system or product with embodied but unprotected knowledge. If this is so, it might 
give the most advanced firms in different technological fields an incentive to go even further in the 
direction of codification but with increasingly negative impact on the distribution of knowledge. 
Another important contradiction in modern capitalism is reflected in the codification process. While 
codification in principle makes knowledge disembodied and more accessible worldwide it also 
makes it easier to exclude others from using it. This tension is reflected in knowledge politics and 
knowledge management. With the most recent developments in the field of intellectual property 
rights where these tend to be stretched to cover new areas including living organisms as well as 
soft-ware the net effect of codification on global access might actually be negative. This may be 
detrimental for the progress of knowledge creation and use worldwide. The creativity of people and 
communities finds itself blocked by too many barriers.    
Conclusions 
The debate on codification has been complicated by the fact that different kinds of codes have been 
alluded to. Some codes are explicit and available in the form of textbooks, manuals, formulas and 
organisational diagrams. Others have developed spontaneously as a local means of communication 
within or between organisations (Arrow 1974). Communities of practise may have their own code 
that gives them privileged access to community knowledge. Epistemological communities that 
bring together scholars contributing to a specific scientific field certainly have their own code. 
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codes. One of the most important sources of innovation is not codifying knowledge but to establish 
social interaction and communication between such communities. We need more of the idealised 
agents referred to by Adam Smith:  
philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, 
upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar 
objects. 
The current scientific as well as business community is highly specialised and there may be a 
scarcity of ‘men of speculation’ with the kind of background that makes it possible for them to 
combine distant and dissimilar objects. To foster such men and women may be a major challenge 
for education systems and for designing career paths in the labour market. 
Another characteristic of intellectual capitalism is the growting urge to privatise what can be 
privatised and to transform shared knowledge into private and legally protected property. The 
ambivalence in the business community between the wish to share knowledge with others and the 
wish to protect your own knowledge from the others has become biased in favour of privatisation. 
To some degree this may be seen as a response to the tendency to make explicit and codify 
knowledge. Whatever the reason it makes access to the knowledge pools even more dependent on 
financial resources and political power.    
The chapter started from the idea of ‘the knowledge based economy’. Our conclusion is that the 
idea of ‘one knowledge-base’ for the economy is misleading and that the kind of knowledge that 
matters for the economy should rather be regarded as many separate ‘pools’, each with limited 
access. Using the standard terminology of economics, most knowledge is neither a strictly private 
nor is it a strictly private good. We would prefer to refer to most useful knowledge as being a 
‘community resource’. More often then not it can neither be appropriated by individuals and nor be 
transformed into a commodity. 
In the rich part of the world knowledge management and knowledge politics should therefore be 
seen as similar to the management of an eco-system. Besides focusing on the growth and quality of 
each pool it is necessary to promote diversity. Establishing new links between separate pools, for 
instance by letting experts with access to one pool get access to another pool, or stimulating experts 
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knowledge policy. 
In less developed countries innovation policy is about tapping into foreign pools and linking them 
to domestic pools and transforming the combination either into innovation and market value or into 
social and collective use. To refer to this process as knowledge transfer or knowledge spill-over is 
to underestimate the efforts necessary and the barriers that may exist. Often it is necessary for the 
less developed economy to go through a process of institutional transition in order to overcome the 
barriers. And some of the knowledge pools in the rich world are surrounded by high fences and 
guarded by company lawyers armed with law-books spelling out intellectual property rights. Others 
may be difficult to localise since they are integrated in networks of more or less invisible academies 
and communities of practice. 
Actually there is a need for a global new new deal where the focus is upon giving less privileged 
parts of the world easier access to the pools of knowledge now controlled by the rich countries and 
by transnational companies. This implies both a reform of the intellectual property right regime of 
WTO and a major investment in competence building in the less developed economies.
4 Without 
such an effort the gaps between rich and poor countries will grow, perhaps with the exception of a 
few big economies, such as China, where the effort to accumulate capital and invest in endogenous 
innovation is enormous (Gu and Lundvall 2006). 
                                                 
4 For an example of an effort to redistribute capacity building in the field of innovation research see www.globelics.org. 
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